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Abstract
In spite of their name, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
may introduce users to new security and privacy threats. Re-
cent studies have shown that some commercial VPNs leak
user traffic to third-party trackers. In light of these develop-
ments, we aim understand how and why a technically savvy
population—university students—chooses and uses VPNs,
whether they are aware of data leakages by VPNs, and how
awareness and attitudes about VPNs affects decisions to use
them. To answer these questions, we conducted 32 in-person
interviews and a survey with 349 respondents, all university
students in the United States. We found that students were
mostly concerned with access to content, and privacy con-
cerns were often secondary. They made tradeoffs to achieve
a particular goal, such as using a free commercial VPN that
potentially collects their online activities simply to access
an online service in a geographically restricted area. Many
users even expected that their VPNs were collecting data
about them, although they did not understand how VPNs work.
Given the proliferation of choices among VPN providers, it
is technically possible to achieve both access and privacy. We
conclude with a discussion, informed by our results, concern-
ing ways to help users make choices about VPNs that help
them access content without compromising privacy.
1 Introduction
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) [20, 34] encrypt all network
traffic from a client device to an intermediate server. As a
result, many users rely on VPNs to access blocked content
or to preserve their privacy. Many VPN services are now
available, with companies from Cloudflare to Facebook now
also provide their own VPNs [6, 19, 24]. Some estimates in-
dicate that the VPN market has grown from $16.5 billion in
2016 to $20.6 billion in 2018 [9]. Yet, despite their relatively
widespread use, and in spite of their name, many VPNs fail
to provide even basic security. For example, some VPNs have
accidentally leaked user traffic, breaking security and privacy
claims made by the providers [13, 21]. Other VPNs may cap-
ture user traffic and send the data to third parties for targeted
advertising [5, 11]. At one point, Facebook Onavo collected
application traffic without notifying users [4, 30].
In light of the fact that many VPN services are not in fact
private, we aim to better understand how well-informed In-
ternet users select VPNs, as well as how and when they use
them. We focus on university students, a population that is
generally technically savvy, and often familiar with VPNs
by virtue of having used them at their respective universities.
The particular demographic, 18-to-22 year olds, are also more
likely to rely on strategies to make themselves less visible
online [22]. We aim to understand how these users make in-
formed decisions about using VPNs while balancing multiple
factors, such as cost, privacy, security, and ease of use. We
focused on the following questions:
• Why do students use VPNs?
• How do students choose which VPNs to use?
• Are students aware of the privacy risks that VPNs pose?
To answer these questions, we performed a qualitative study
with two parts: (1) in-depth interviews with 32 university stu-
dents, and (2) a large-scale survey of 349 university students.
We found that most university students used VPNs to gain
access to content and materials at their institutions (e.g., re-
stricted pages, library materials), or to bypass censorship or
filtering of content. Interestingly, privacy and security were
secondary considerations. Students made tradeoffs with their
privacy and security to achieve a pragmatic goal, such as using
a free VPN that may collect information about their browsing
history in order to access geographically restricted content.
Indeed, many students did not expect VPNs to provide pri-
vacy and even expect that the provider may be collecting data
about them and even providing access to that data to other
third parties.
We also found that students were generally not familiar
with the technical details of how a VPN works, which often
led to misconceptions and misunderstandings about the pri-
vacy guarantees that a VPN could provide. Some of these
misunderstandings were even more fundamental, suggesting
that not only did students not understand technically how
VPNs work, but they also did not understand the capabili-
ties and incentives for various VPN providers to collect data
about them. For example, although many students indicated
that they used a VPN to protect their data from “companies”
in general, they seemed unconcerned that the VPN provider
itself is a company (and, in the case of some, such as Face-
book’s Onavo VPN, even an advertiser) that is often gathering
user data for profit.
Our results suggest possible future directions for helping
Internet users safely use VPNs, particularly along the lines
of improving awareness about how data collection works
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and when it is happening. Users not only misunderstand the
technical capabilities of VPNs, but they have also adopted
learned helplessness with respect to privacy. Better technical
design can lead not only to more informed users, but also
instill positive outcomes where users can use that information
to make better choices about their selection and use of VPNs.
2 Background and Related Work
We provide background on VPNs and survey related work,
including work studying privacy and security vulnerabilities
from VPNs and past studies of user attitudes about privacy.
2.1 Background
Originally created for enterprises to communicate securely,
VPNs rapidly gained broad commercial appeal as personal In-
ternet usage soared [10]. VPNs are one of the many tools that
Internet users can utilize to protect against online privacy and
security risks. VPNs work by creating a secure, private con-
nection (i.e., a “tunnel”) through the provider’s server through
which the user can safely access a destination server [32].
VPN providers can encrypt and authenticate this connection
using a number of methods with varying degrees of effec-
tiveness, including OpenVPN, Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol,
Internet Protocol Security, and several others [32]. From the
perspective of a network eavesdropper, the VPN user’s traffic
appears to be coming from the VPN server, as opposed to
from the user’s device.
Depending on the provider and the user’s goals, VPNs can
be used to access destinations on the Internet or on private
networks. Users in areas with censored Internet access can
utilize VPNs to access blocked content, such as Twitter in
China [2]. More generally, users can use VPNs to access
location-restricted content regardless of their physical loca-
tions [17]. Commercial VPN providers often offer multiple
servers located in areas with open Internet access, such as the
US or Hong Kong [18]. Other VPN users may use VPNs to ac-
cess content on a private network. For example, a university’s
VPN may allow off-campus users to access the university’s
library system. Of course, assuming a strong encryption pro-
tocol and a trustworthy provider, VPNs also provide better
privacy and security in normal, day-to-day Internet usage.
Users may want to protect against Internet Service Provider
snooping when browsing at home, or against hackers when us-
ing unsecured public Wi-Fi hotspots. Although solely relying
on VPNs is not enough to protect users user from online data
collection, it can be very valuable when utilized in tandem
with other privacy-preserving tools and tactics such as tracker
blockers.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss related work on data leakages in
VPNs, user attitudes on privacy, and user studies of privacy-
enhancing technologies.
2.2.1 VPN Data Leakage
Related studies exist on the effectiveness of VPNs, includ-
ing research on data leakage and traffic manipulation. Re-
searchers studied 14 of most popular VPN providers and
found that most of these providers unintentionally leak traffic
to websites hosted on IPv6 addresses [21]. Researchers have
also found that off-the-shelf VPN software is susceptible to
passive and active attacks, limiting their ability to provide
anonymity [1, 3]. Other researchers studied commercial VPN
providers and found five providers that implement transparent
proxies, which inspect and modify traffic that users send [13].
Finally, researchers studied VPN apps in the Android market-
place, finding that many of these apps send data to third-party
trackers or have security misconfigurations [11, 35].
There is a lack of literature on end users’ perceptions and
usage habits for VPNs, as well as how these perceptions re-
late to attitudes and behaviors towards privacy and security.
Researchers surveyed Pakistani Internet users and found that
57% of respondents used VPNs to access YouTube while the
website was censored in 2012 [14]. However, to our knowl-
edge, there are no studies that explore in depth why Internet
users configure VPNs in general and their attitudes on privacy
and security. To this end, we gain insights by studying why
university students use VPNs and what their usage habits are.
In addition, there have been no published usability studies on
VPN services. Further exploration is needed on the end user-
side of VPNs to better inform their design and messaging.
2.2.2 User Attitudes on Privacy
Other studies have analyzed users’ knowledge of the Internet
in general, as well as privacy and security practices. A number
of researchers have also analyzed users’ mental models in
their perceptions of the Internet [15, 23]. In terms of data col-
lection, Americans are concerned by the online tracking usage
of their data by outside entities, but lack an understanding of
how their data is used or transmitted [28, 31]. In particular,
they expressed higher concern towards how third parties track
and collect their data [25]. However, users are confused as
to how this online tracking works and how they can protect
themselves [27].
Researchers have also tried to find stronger connections
to the usage of privacy and security tools. One study sug-
gested that a combination of awareness of, motivation to use,
and knowledge of how to use privacy and security tools im-
pacted their usage [7]. However, another study focused on
online privacy and security attitudes and behaviors found that
while Internet users with stronger technical backgrounds were
more aware of privacy and security threats, they did not en-
gage in more secure practices than their less knowledgeable
peers [12]. The phenomenon of tech-savvy users neglecting
to utilize their knowledge to protect themselves could have
interesting implications for VPN-focused studies.
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Age # % Gender # % Origin # % Educational status # %
18 to 24 26 81% Female 17 53% United States 12 37.5% Postdoctoral Researchers 4 13%
25 to 34 5 16% Male 14 44% International 20 62.5% Graduate students 2 6%
35 to 44 1 3% Other 1 3% Undergraduate students 26 81 %
Table 1: The distribution over age, gender, origin and education status for 32 interview participants, at the time of collecting the data; 20
international participants came from 17 different countries.
3 Method
We study how and why students use VPNs, their mental mod-
els VPNs, how they choose which VPN to use (and which
ones they choose), and their awareness and attitudes about
data collection practices of VPN providers. Importantly, we
do not expect the findings from this population to general-
ize to other populations of Internet users; rather, our results
provide key insights that may inform further research. To
understand students’ general attitudes about VPNs, we con-
ducted 32 qualitative interviews [26] and a large scale survey
with 349 university students from one of our institutions.
3.1 Interviews
Before participating in a semi-structured interview, partici-
pants were asked to fill out a consent form and a short ques-
tionnaire, where we collected demographic information and
data about their general online habits and behavior. We col-
lected their academic majors and other basic demographic
information such as age, gender, and course of study. The in-
terview guide was structured to first get a better understanding
of participants’ knowledge and background and participants’
general privacy and security awareness. First, we asked partic-
ipants who they believed could collect data about them online
and who they would want to prevent seeing certain informa-
tion about their online habits. We then asked participants to
describe how a VPN works. Next, we asked how they learned
about VPNs and what their first experience using a VPN was.
We then asked how participants choose to use a particular
VPN and how and why they use a VPN, how participants
felt when using a VPN, and whether they use a paid or free
versions of VPNs. Finally, we asked about VPN issues and
improvements, students’ knowledge and usage patterns of
different VPN types, including specific VPNs they had used,
about reasons for selecting and using VPNs, perceptions of
data collection by VPNs, and any other issues that they faced.
3.1.1 Recruitment
We recruited 32 interview participants. Table 1 shows demo-
graphic data of the interview participants, who were mostly
18–24 years old and undergraduate students (81%). We fil-
tered for students who had used a VPN before, and for stu-
dents that are currently enrolled in a particular United States
university’s undergraduate or graduate program. We aimed
to recruit a variety of international and domestic students liv-
ing in the U.S. We concluded that such diverse group would
expand our knowledge and understanding on how and why
participants use VPNs. Interviews were conducted in Sum-
mer and Fall 2018. Participants were compensated with a $20
Amazon gift card. We conducted 23 interviews via Skype, and
another nine were conducted on a university campus. Four
interview participants did not give consent to recording, so
detailed notes were taken during these interviews. All other
interviews were audio-taped.
3.1.2 Data Analysis
We first transcribed all recorded interviews and developed an
extensive codebook to apply to the interview transcripts and
field notes. We used the Dedoose platform [8] for all interview
analysis following a standard inductive coding approach [26].
One of the research team coded all of the interview transcripts
and a second member of the team reviewed the codes. We had
1906 codes in total, including 45 parent codes. We focused on
10 of these parent codes and 33 child codes, shown in Table
??, for analysis in this paper. Once the transcripts were all
coded, the researcher involved in coding wrote up summaries
of the coded transcripts and themes arising from this initial
analysis phase. The rest of the research team reviewed the
summaries and held regular research meetings to decide on
the final themes arising from the interviews.
3.2 Survey
Based on the interview data and analysis, we then designed a
larger-scale survey to complement our interviews data and ex-
pand our knowledge about VPN users’ perspectives. We first
pre-screened and filtered out respondents who did not consent
to the survey, were under 18, or had never used a VPN. As in
the interviews, we collected academic majors and other basic
demographic information such as age, gender, and course of
study. We also collected background information about re-
spondents’ perceptions and concerns about data collection,
including the nature of the data collected, who is collecting
data, and why they are collecting data. We also asked about
respondents’ usage patterns of different tools and tactics to
combat online risks, as well as how they sourced them.
We asked similar questions as in the interviews, but we
generally avoided open-ended questions to prevent user fa-
tigue and reduce the complexity of data analysis; as a re-
sult, we asked only three open-ended questions. We also
avoided double-barreled questions, negative questions, and
biased wording [16]. We included two attention check ques-
tions that required a certain response to ensure respondents
were answering mindfully. Participants that had been inter-
viewed in the first part of our study were not allowed to take
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Age # % Gender # % Origin # % Educational Status # %
18 to 25 274 79% Female 178 51% United States 257 74% Graduate Students 123 35%
26 to 35 74 21% Male 171 49% International 92 26% Undergraduate Students 226 65%
36+ 1 0%
Table 2: The distribution over age, gender, origin, and education status for 349 survey participants, at the time of collecting the data. Our 92
international participants came from 32 different countries.
the survey, in order to avoid response bias.
3.2.1 Recruitment
We recruited undergraduate and graduate students from a large
university in the United States to take the survey on Qualtrics.
We sent email invitations to a random sample (containing
2,748 people) of the university population via an institutional
survey research center. We aimed to reach at least 5% of the
university’s VPN-using student population as recommended
by Lazar [16]. We launched and conducted the survey be-
tween February 2019 and March 2019. Our large sample size
allowed us to collect 452 responses, of which 349 were com-
pleted, passed our attention checks, and fit our recruiting cri-
teria. Our final sample of 349 valid and completed responses
is large compared to university’s overall population (4.3%).
Table 2 shows detailed demographic data of the respondents.
As with the interviews, the majority of them were age 25 and
under (79%). Participants with complete valid responses were
entered into a draw for one of two $250 Amazon gift cards.
3.2.2 Data Analysis
We used Qualtrics and R to analyze the survey data. We first
analyzed the response data using tools built-in with Qualtrics.
We limited our analysis to the 349 valid and complete re-
sponses. First, we performed descriptive analysis on all the
survey questions. The respondents were required to answer
every question except for Figures 10 and 11, but certain ques-
tions were only shown when applicable. As such, questions
that have fewer than 349 data points contain responses from
every applicable respondent; a lack of response does not indi-
cate a respondent’s choice to abstain, unless it was an open-
ended question. In presenting our results, we show counts in
terms of how many participants were shown a question.
We also include counts for those who were not shown the
question, or chose not to answer in the case of Figures 10
and 11. We qualitatively coded the open-ended answers in a
similar fashion to the interviews using a code book that was
developed based on multiple reads through the responses. In
the graphs presented, response count reflects the total number
of participants who chose an option, oftentimes this was in
answer to a “Check all that apply” question, so the total of all
the responses may be greater than 349 if any participant se-
lected multiple options. In questions where participants were
asked to choose and rank options, we compute a weighted
score on the inverse ranking, where weights correspond to
1/r for a ranking of r [29].
We also searched pairwise correlations across the results
of each survey question. We reduced the number of observed
variables by consolidating questions into fewer categories
when applicable. Given the broad nature of this study, we
were unable to account for unpredictable human behavior and
the many unobserved variables that substantially impacted
the practicality of this analysis. As such, we expected the
pairwise correlations to produce numerous significant values
(p < .05), but with low R. The tests confirmed our hypothesis,
but the correlations were not sufficiently meaningful to report.
For certain survey questions, we show additional figures
for meaningful differences in responses between two groups:
a) all participants (N=349), and b) participants that only use
VPNs provided by their university (N=49). For other survey
questions, we did not find meaningful differences in responses
between the two groups, so we do not show additional fig-
ures. When reporting our qualitative data, we refer to survey
participants’ as "S" and to interview participants as "P".
3.3 Limitations
We interviewed 32 participants to better understand how the
students in our study interact with VPNs. Our sample was not
varied in terms of drawing on people who were not based in
the United States or from other universities. Our survey also
has some inherent drawbacks. Recall bias is difficult to avoid
in any survey [16]. Our survey and interviews were not com-
pletely anonymous as they required survey participants who
wished to enter the raffle and all interview participants to sub-
mit an email. Additionally, interview participants were asked
to meet with one of the research team in person. This could
introduce error in the respondents’ levels of honesty. Future
research could build on our results using other methods.
Finally, our survey participants were limited to students at
one university in the United States, and our interview pool was
mostly limited to the same university’s students. Although the
university makes a concerted attempt to recruit a diverse cross-
section of students, any single university will necessarily be
systematically different from the university students in the
U.S. as a whole. Future research could replicate this study
with other populations of interest. (To assist with reproducing
this study, we will release our survey instrument and interview
scripts.)
4 Results
In this section, we report on how and why students used VPNs,
their mental models of VPNs, how they chose between VPN
providers, and their awareness/attitudes on data collection by
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(b) Participants that only used university VPNs.
Figure 1: Why do/did you use a VPN? (responses selected by participants)
VPN providers.
4.1 How and Why Students Use VPNs
We found that although privacy is of some concern for stu-
dents, it is often secondary consideration. Furthermore, most
students did not use VPNs regularly. When they did use VPNs,
it was mainly to access blocked content and institutional ma-
terials, not to protect privacy.
4.1.1 Students mostly use VPNs to access content
Interview Most interview participants (21/32) reported that
they used a VPN to bypass geographic firewalls, and to watch
movies or TV shows online (15/32). For eleven interview
participants, accessing blocked content was the priority when
using a VPN. In a typical example, P11 spoke of using a VPN
for news websites that were not blocked but had different or
limited content depending on IP address of the Internet user.
As they were from United Kingdom (UK), they wanted to
access the UK BBC website while they were in the US. Also,
P26 shared that they used a VPN in order to help their mom:
Venezuela has blocked everything coming from their
YouTube channels, and I have my mom reroute the US
IP address to a Mexican IP address with a VPN, so then
she could watch her Venezuelan TV shows.
Nevertheless, interviewees would use VPNs to resolve differ-
ent issues, as P24 explained:
I found out that I couldn’t access the application or login
to my account through the phone application, because
I wasn’t in the United States(. . . ) And I downloaded, I
think it’s called Express VPN. And that was able to help
me work around the location, geographical issue, and
access the account so I could cancel the subscription.
Survey Most survey respondents also used a VPN to access
content, specifically institutional materials when off cam-
pus (230/349) (Figure 1a). More survey respondents reported
using a VPN to bypass Internet censorship (168/349) than
those wanting to protect privacy or security (138/349).
For those who specified “Other” in the survey, students
commonly reported using a VPN to access Advanced Place-
ment (AP) scores, as S108 noted: “To access AP scores early
(they were releasing them one time zone at a time to prevent
too much web traffic)”.
Of the 49/349 students who only used VPNs provided by
their university, these students were most concerned with ac-
cessing institutional materials (44/49) but not with accessing
blocked content (4/49). (Figure 1b).
4.1.2 Many students were not using a VPN for privacy
Interview Thirteen interview participants said that privacy
was not the main reason for using a VPN. Fewer (7/32) used it
to protect their personal information, and four wanted a VPN
to be secure and keep them anonymous, such as, P21:
I guess I don’t like the idea of [the university] or an ISP
being able to see all of my traffic. I don’t think that I trust
anyone with all of my traffic or consumer habits.
A few interview participants (3/32) used VPNs because they
liked the idea that there was a “free” space on the Internet.
For these types of participants, using a VPN could be a strong
statement that security is important, as P25 explained:
It’s why Private Network Access got so popular. They
tried to subpoena the guys to release information about
some of the people who used the VPN, and then they
actually didn’t have it on their servers. So people knew
that they didn’t keep records, so everybody started using
that one.
Yet, some interview participants trusted VPNs more than other
networks. For instance, five participants said they would use
a VPN while on public Wi-Fi and four while traveling.
Survey Similarly, 126/349 of survey respondents said that
they used VPNs to protect their privacy, and 105/349 said
that they use VPNs for security (Figure 1a). We asked these
respondents to choose and rank who they were protecting
themselves from when using a VPN. Most of these survey
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Figure 4: What do you think a VPN is?
(response coded by researchers)
respondents ranked companies, hackers, the government, and
websites as top concerns. As shown in Figure 2, fewer partici-
pants were concerned about other governments or friends and
family. Privacy or security were less important for students
that only used their university-provided VPN (15/49).
4.1.3 Students use VPNs on-demand
Interview Seven interview participants reported using VPNs
only when they needed to, while 4/32 participants would
always have it on. One interviewee from the former group
explained that VPNs would take up storage on their computer,
as well as battery life while using it. Another example of
on-demand usage was from P26, who was restricted by the
bandwidth limitations of Windscribe, a free VPN:
Like the Windscribe, I get 10GB every month, and I cer-
tainly go through more than 10GB of internet.
Survey VPN usage appeared to be more irregular and on an
“as needed” basis among both interview participants and sur-
vey respondents. Most survey respondents (201/349) reported
they did not currently use a VPN, with only 148/349 survey
respondents reporting that they currently use a VPN. When
asked how often survey respondents use a VPN, 302/349 re-
ported only using a VPN sometimes or rarely. A minority
reported using a VPN all the time (10/349) or most of the
time (37/349). Figure 3 shows that of the 201 respondents
that stopped using VPNs, some reported that they were no
longer location restricted (92/349), did not have anything to
hide (74/349), or simply did not use it enough (68/349). Very
few of these respondents reported a lack of security (3/349) to
be a contributing factor in their decision to stop using VPNs.
4.2 Mental Models
In this section, we report our findings on students’ mental
models of VPNs. We found that students could generally
define what a VPN is, but they were less familiar with the
technical details of how VPNs work.
Interview We found that most interview participants had a
fairly good idea about the purpose of a VPN. However, most
participants were less familiar with technical explanations.
Almost half (14/32) of the interview participants described a
VPN as routing your Internet activity through third party ma-
chines or as a service for changing your IP address, masking
your identity (10/32), or reducing others ability to track you
(10/32). P18 explained:
It’s sort of a middle man. So instead of you actually
downloading the file from someplace where somebody
might be looking at you downloading it, they download
it for you and then they send it to your computer. So it
figures that they downloaded it and not you.
Some participants believed that VPNs allow you to access
blocked content (13/32), allow access into another network
(7/32) and others described a VPN as secure, private, or adding
an extra level of safety (13/32). In a quote typical of what we
heard in participants, P25 described benefits of using a VPN:
Its usefulness is pragmatism, it’s like, “I need to see this
YouTube video, but they don’t let me see it in Brazil so
I’m just going to do it in Belgium.” I think that that’s
what VPNs are to me.
Survey Similarly, when asked what a VPN is (Figure 4),
most survey participants could list features of a VPN such as
location spoofing (153/349). As S255 described, for them a
VPN was “Tricking my Internet to think I’m somewhere else
in the world.” Survey respondents also described a VPN as a
private or secure connection (133/349). As S283 reported:
It’s been described to me as an “Internet condom." It pro-
tects your Internet information by setting up a different
IP address.
Other survey respondents defined a VPN as an intermedi-
ary (86/349), for example S78 reported that “It’s a porthole
to allow private communication/data transfer between two
devices.” Ten survey respondents reported they did not know
what VPNs are or how to define them.
4.3 How Students Choose VPNs
Many students in our study began using VPNs before entering
university, and ranked cost, security, and ease of use ahead of
privacy when choosing a VPN. Most students also liked VPNs
more for accessing content rather than privacy and security.
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Figure 5: When did you first use a VPN? (response selected by
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4.3.1 Many students learn about VPNs in high school
Interview Two interview participants reported that they first
started using VPNs when they were in high school. Typifying
what we heard, P20 told us how he used it to get access to
sites that were blocked by his high school:
I’ve used them for a few reasons, but privacy was never
really one of them. It was just when my content was
restricted when I was in boarding school, I went to board-
ing school for high school. Our Wi-Fi was very tightly
patrolled. So any number of things were blocked, like
from adult content, to a lot of sports websites for instance
were blocked, because they “encouraged gambling” and
I like to watch a lot of sports online illegally, because that
was the only way I could watch them.
Another participant, P26, shared how they used a VPN to
download a graphics editor, which they could not afford in
high school:
The university computers came with a standard photo ed-
itor that was pretty bad. So we wanted to use Photoshop,
and Photoshop is very expensive. So one of my friends
recommended that we torrent it from The Pirate Bay, so
we went on there, and I remember it has a warning that
says, make sure your IP is masked(. . . ) I did that, and
then we downloaded Photoshop for a university project.
I think I was maybe 16 at the time.
Nevertheless, some interview participants found it hard to
learn about VPNs, as P18 said:
I’ve actually never heard VPNs brought up in conversa-
tions among my friends. That’s because I think they’re
pretty obscure at the moment. The usage of this VPN sort
of hinges on two things, the desire to obtain copyrighted
material for free and also the knowledge of the existence
of VPNs. Those are two I think pretty big bottlenecks
that sort of limit this sort of information to sort of tech
nerds.
Survey This sentiment was confirmed by our survey respon-
dents who reported first using a VPN at their university
(156/349) or their high school (123/349) (Figure 5).
4.3.2 Students consider many factors to choose a VPN
Interview Interviewees and survey respondents differed
slightly in terms of how they chose a VPN to use. For most
interview participants (19/32), the most important factor was
that the VPN provider had a good reputation; three interview
participants added that if their friends had used a VPN before,
then they were more likely to use one. Ten interview partic-
ipants had various security and privacy requirements, such
as making sure that the VPN had a secure network, that the
VPN provider did not store any of user’ records, that the VPN
provider did not sell users’ information, and that the VPN
protects users’ data. For one participant it was important that
a VPN did not require any personal information when setting
up the account and another one wanted an option of secure
payment. When we asked interview participants how they de-
termined whether their VPN provider was trustworthy, 13/32
said they checked that it had good reviews online. Another
10/32 would verify that through word of mouth and 7/32 knew
it was trustworthy because of who provided access to their
VPN, such as the university.
Our interview participants also indicated that ease of use
(8/32), speed (7/32), cost (6/32), and ease of set up (5/32) were
important. Five interview participants said that they looked
at the price before purchasing a subscription; five said that
it was important that VPN was for free; and four said that
would always choose a cheaper option. For example, for P11,
the main factors were word of mouth, experts’ opinion, cost
as well as customer service available:
I look on, Tech Radar and PC Monitor, those kinds of web-
sites, (. . . ) I get some reviews from friends (. . . )So, when
I came to China I was deciding between Express and
Astro, and I just looked on their websites, went through,
server locations, cost, and their privacy policies, (. . . )
available customer service, which was very important as
well.
Survey On the other hand, as shown in Figure 6, the most
important considerations as ranked by survey respondents for
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choosing between VPNs were cost, security, and ease of use.
Fewer participants valued privacy, and speed and transparency
were rated fairly low overall.
4.3.3 Students value access over security & privacy
Interview We asked interviewees about their general expe-
rience and feelings related to VPN usage. We also asked
whether they saw any differences in their Internet experience
when using VPNs. Ten interviewees found the biggest differ-
ence in being able to access blocked content, and 8/32 felt
more secure. Nevertheless, 10/32 interviewees did not see
any difference in the way they used the Internet and did not
observe changes in their online habits. P20 noted:
I sort of have the assumption that any time I use the
Internet, any privacy I have is super limited. But you
would think that using a VPN would help with that in
some way. I don’t think it would actually change my
behavior online at all, but I think it would definitely make
you feel a bit more secure in that.
Survey We asked survey respondents to report, in short-
answer form, what they liked and disliked about VPNs, as
shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. The ability to access blocked
content (e.g. geo-restricted video streaming websites), institu-
tional content, or other kinds of content was by far the most
commonly liked feature of students’ VPNs (223/349). S131
appreciated that they could have access to many things:
It allows me to view content that is restricted by a time
zone limit like test scores, acceptance letters etc. Also
if you’re in another country that doesn’t allow certain
media platforms (e.g., Netflix, Hulu), VPNs allow you to
access them.
Other qualities, including security, privacy and interface re-
ceived far fewer mentions. Survey respondents did not like
slow (83/349) and unstable (83/349) VPN connections. S192
shared their frustration:
The connection is very slow and unstable, and it would
often turn off while I was accessing the Internet so that I
would have to reload everything.
Survey respondents did not like the complexity of interfaces
and their features. As S306 explained:
It is annoying to log into all the time, and it automatically
logs me out after a designated amount of time.
and S279:
It is difficult to use and the set-up process is confusing.
Selecting a new VPN is very confusing because there are
so many options.
Forty-eight survey participants also complained about cost.
For example, they did not like that free VPNs have limited
server locations and they have to pay for unlocking more.
4.4 Which VPNs Students Choose
Students in our study felt most comfortable with using VPNs
provided by their institutions. They were puzzled whether
commercial VPNs actually provide privacy and security. Thus,
they believed that a university VPN was a safer choice.
4.4.1 University VPNs are most prevalent
Interview During the interviews, we learned that 16/32 of
participants used work related or institutional VPNs. Among
them, 12/16 specifically reported using VPNs provided by
their university, and 6/16 had never used any commercial
VPNs. We also found that 10/32 interviewees used free VPNs
and 7/32 used paid or free trial version of a paid VPN.
Survey We observed a similar pattern in the responses from
survey participants. Most survey respondents used the VPN
offered by their university (228/349). Nearly half also used
free commercial VPNs (172/349). A smaller fraction of stu-
dents in our study used paid commercial VPNs (97/349). Fig-
ure 9 summarizes these results. Fewer survey respondents
used VPNs through their employer (60/349) or a personal
VPN that they set up themselves (23/349).
Figure 10 shows the most common paid commercial VPNs
that students we surveyed reportedly used. We find that sur-
vey respondents used a variety of paid VPNs, including Ex-
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pressVPN (40/97), NordVPN (18/97), and PrivateInternetAc-
cess (10/97). There is also a long tail of less popular choices,
with 50 students using paid commercial VPNs that five or less
other students used. Eight survey participants that reportedly
used paid commercial VPNs did not specify particular VPNs.
Figure 11 shows the most common free commercial
VPNs students we surveyed reportedly used: Hotspot Shield
(40/172), TunnelBear (33/172), Hola (27/172), and Better-
net (25/172). Notably, some respondents indicated they used
SonicWall or ConnectTunnel which is the VPN offered by
the university, indicating some confusion on what is an insti-
tutional versus commercial VPN provider. Furthermore, 35
surveyees that reportedly used free commercial VPNs did not
specify which VPNs they used.
4.4.2 Students feel safer using their university VPN
Students in our study were more comfortable with university-
provided VPNs and paid commercial VPNs than free com-
mercial VPNs.
Interview When asked whether it was important who their
VPN provider was, 11/32 interview participants reported that
it was important, especially for these who used their univer-
sity’s VPN (7/11). University VPNs were reassuring for them
because they believed they were safe to use. However, inter-
viewees were split on what they were willing to do online
using their university or work related VPN. For instance, 5/16
interview participants who used their university VPN reported
that they would use it only for completing university work, be-
cause they simply did not feel private, they felt that university
could track them, or that using their university network made
them more vulnerable. P13 gave an example about a student
who shut down exams by hacking into their university’s VPN
through another VPN to show how the university VPN was
still vulnerable. On the other hand, 5/16 other interview par-
ticipants told us they used their university VPN for private
activities, such as browsing. For example, P32 would simply
forget to switch it off and did not mind having it on:
It really doesn’t bother me if someone is looking at what
I’m doing while I’m on the VPN, just because my philos-
ophy is like, at this point it’s probably all there anyway.
We found that 14/32 interview participants would not pay at-
tention to or care about who their VPN provider was. For one
of these interview participants, it was not important that the
university was their provider, as they explained–the university
is only a client of another provider, not a provider itself.
Survey Figure 12 shows that the interview results were mir-
rored in that more survey respondents felt safe using the uni-
versity or employer provided VPNs than with free commercial
VPNs.
4.4.3 Students are confused about the privacy guaran-
tees of both paid and free VPNs
Interview We found that 22/32 interview participants would
use free VPNs while ensuring they were safe, and 9/32 said
that they would not use them because they did not feel safe.
Nevertheless, many were confused about the benefits of using
a free versus paid VPN, as expressed by P24:
I think the one that you have to pay for is more trustwor-
thy. But, it could easily be the other way around. Just
because you have to pay for something doesn’t mean that
it is more reliable, or even more efficient. But, I do think
that the paid ones generally people might think that they
are more safe to use. And that their information may be
more secured, just because of that added price tag on it.
Survey
Figure 12 shows how safe survey participants felt using free
VPNs, paid VPNs, and VPNs provided through their school
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Figure 13: Why do you think your VPN provider collects your data? (responses selected by participants)
or employer. We only show data for students that have used
one or more of these VPN types. We find that, proportionally,
survey participants felt most safe or somewhat safe using paid
VPNs (52/97) and school/employer VPNs (127/238) than free
VPNs (50/172). However, many more survey participants re-
ported using free VPNs than paid VPNs, even though they
felt less safe. We believe this is because most survey partic-
ipants used VPNs to access content, rather than to improve
their privacy or security. Thus, they may have been especially
willing to risk their privacy and security in order to freely
access blocked content. We note that eight participants that
used paid VPNs and 35 participants that used free VPNs gave
no answer as to how safe they felt.
4.5 Expectations About VPN Data Collection
Students in our study were unsure about the data collection
practices of VPN providers. They believed their data could
be collected, but they did not necessarily understand the con-
sequences or who else could access their data.
4.5.1 Students believe VPNs collect data about them
Interview Most interview participants (23/32) believed that
VPNs collect their data, with some expressing that VPNs keep
data for statistics or to sell the data. For example, P11 believed
that VPNs could keep logs for many different reasons:
If you’re using VPNs for a bit more nefarious means, for
example, like buying drugs or trading child pornography
and things like that. (. . . ) I think some of them do keep
logs, and they’re able to give them over to police, and the
governments, and things like that. (. . . ) And then, other
ones are a bit more simple, like tracking people’s web
habits to sell to advertisers and things like that.
Several interview participants (7/32) also believed that the
university has a VPN to access all information about students
and to monitor if someone is cheating during exams.
Survey Interestingly, we found that 259/349 of survey partici-
pants similarly believed that their VPN provider could collect
data about them. Figure 13a shows that most of these 259
respondents believed that VPNs collect data for commercial
motives (178/259), or simply because data collection is a “de-
fault consequence of using the Internet” (177/259). We also
found that 126/259 of respondents selected both options. Very
few survey respondents believed that the motives for data
collection were nefarious—such as blackmail (9/259)—and
a good proportion of survey respondents selected "I don’t
know" (27/259).
We also found that 33 out of the 49 survey participants
who only use VPNs provided by their university believed that
their VPN provider collect data about them. As with the other
survey participants, they believed that this was both a default
consequence of the Internet and for advertising purposes (Fig-
ure 13b). Thus, regardless of who provides their VPN or why
they use it, students believed they were being tracked.
4.5.2 Awareness of collection, but not access & sharing
Interview We asked interview participants about their opin-
ion on VPN data sharing practices. When asked whether they
thought their VPN providers could be sharing their informa-
tion, 17/32 responded “no” and 11/32 “yes”, but 12/32 were
uncertain about their response, because they did not feel like
they would be able to know anyway. P26 explained:
If they share it with someone, then they’re not sharing it in
a way that I would be able to tell, because, for example,
I’ve never seen personalized ads from things that I’ve
looked at while on the VPN.
From the interview participants who said that VPN providers
do not share information with other entities, eight confessed
that they hope their information was not being shared, and
five admitted that while their VPN providers do not share any
information, other VPN providers may do so. Two of these
participants believed that even though their VPN providers do
not share data with others on regular basis, they would with
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Figure 15: Who do you think has access to the data collected by your VPN? (responses selected by participants)
legal authorities. For instance, P14 shared:
If the Chinese government were to really threaten them.
This is a very hypothetical situation. I think information
which they could be able to collect and which would be
interesting would probably be something like on a service
level, the actual content that you’ve been accessing. Like
the actual service or addresses which you’ve accessed
recently as well as the associated file or data which is
generated while somebody is accessing the Internet.
Survey We also asked survey participants who believed that
VPNs collected their data what they think collect. Figure 14a
shows that most participants believed that VPNs collect loca-
tion data (226/259) and online activities (191/259) . Fewer be-
lieved that VPNs collected private messages (44/259), record-
ings (39/259), or keystrokes (38/259). Some participants did
not know what data was collected (25/259). There was also
little consensus between survey participants on who had ac-
cess to the data collected by VPNs. The largest proportion
of survey respondents, as shown in Figure 15a, believed that
companies (112/259) and the government (88/259) had access
to the data. A smaller number believed that only the VPN had
access (47/259), and 50/259 of survey respondents indicated
that they did not know where their data went.
We also found that a plurality of survey participants that
only used university VPNs believed their university could see
their location and online activities (Figure 14b, Figure 15b).
This result is particularly interesting because these partici-
pants mainly used VPNs to access institutional material, rather
than for privacy or to access location-restricted content (Fig-
ure 1b). Thus, it seems that even students who only used
VPNs provided by their university had a somewhat defeatist
attitude about their ability to remain private.
Figure 16a shows that the 212/349 respondents that believe
VPNs share their data thought that their location (157/212),
online activities (149/212), interests (122/212), and demo-
graphic information (121/212) were shared. Fewer believed
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Figure 16: What information do you think is being shared with these entities? (responses selected by participants)
that private messages, recordings, or keystrokes were shared,
which coincides with what survey participants believed VPNs
were able to collect. Figure 16b also shows that 16/49 survey
participants who only used VPNs provided by their university
believed that their location or online activities were being
shared with third parties. These results suggest that students
believed their online activities are collected by first parties
and third parties, regardless of why they used VPNs.
4.5.3 Students do not expect anonymity from VPNs
Interview More interview participants did not believe that
VPNs guaranteed them anonymity (20/32) than those who felt
the VPN did offer privacy and anonymity (8/32). In fact, three
quarters of interview participants (24/32) told us that you can
be tracked while using VPNs, and some believed that there is
always a way to do so (8/32) and that you can be tracked by
VPN provider itself (9/32). P1 explained:
If it is SSL encryption, the VPN provider would still
know that you are communicating with a certain web
service but the VPN provider would not or probably not
know the contents of the communication if it’s SSL en-
crypted. They would only know who you want to com-
municate with. And if it’s not encrypted, then they can
see. They can be doing packet sniffing or even more ma-
licious things like deep packet injection and deep packet
inspection to actually look at the contents of that commu-
nication and do potential malicious things with that.
Moreover, 4/24 interview participants were convinced that
the government could track you even while using a VPN. For
example, P30 used a VPN only in different countries to access
blocked content. They did not continue to use a VPN in the
US as they did not need a VPN to access content anymore
and did not see any privacy advantages because all VPNs are
“partially, controlled or transparent to the government". Other
interview participants (2/24) believed that one can still be
tracked by advertising agencies even if the VPN makes track-
ing at least harder than normal. To overcome tracking issues,
P21 explained that using a VPN is not enough and instead
they changed locations frequently when they connected to a
VPN:
Yes [I can be tracked while using a VPN], especially if
I’m using the same IP address. That creates a problem be-
cause my Internet footprint . . . Or Chrome, for example,
my web browser could definitely still track me and con-
nect that, see where I’ve been connecting from. Or Gmail
could see that. Gmail always tells you, “Oh, you’ve con-
nected from this weird device, or from this location that
we don’t recognize.” So I think you can definitely still be
tracked.
Survey Figure 17a shows that survey participants generally
did not feel that VPNs provided total anonymity as well. Three
quarters of all survey respondents indicated that they thought
their VPNs guaranteed access to certain content (263/349)
and masking of their IP addresses (186/349). However, only
around one third of survey respondents believed that their
VPNs guaranteed privacy (125/349), anonymity (104/349),
and safety from tracking (99/349). As Figure 17b shows, we
see similar results for students that only use VPNs provided
by their university. A smaller proportion of these students
believed that their VPN guaranteed them anonymity (5/49).
5 Discussion
Our findings reveal that students had significant gaps in men-
tal models about what VPNs are, what data they collect, and
how VPN providers may ultimately use this data (Section
4.2). Thus, they often did not choose a VPN provider that
both (1) enabled them to achieve a particular goal (such as
accessing content) and (2) respected their privacy. They also
believed that data collection by VPN providers and third par-
ties alike was a default consequence of the Internet (Section
4.5). We discuss several possible areas for future work towards
improving attitudes and awareness about data collection, both
at the time the student is choosing which VPN to use and
during the time the student is using the VPN. By doing so,
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Figure 17: What do you think your VPN guarantees? (responses selected by participants)
students may be empowered to make informed decisions be-
tween which VPN provider they use to protect their privacy.
Students may ultimately benefit from tools that concretely
demonstrate what can be inferred from data that VPNs
intentionally leak to third parties. For example, Hotspot
Shield—a popular commercial VPN with millions of users—
leaks information about users to several trackers. Any time
a user visits a website that includes trackers hosted on
www.google-analytics.com, pixel.quantserve.com, or
event.shelljacket.us, Hotspot Shield communicates
with the trackers outside of the VPN [33]. The trackers can
then collect the user’s real IP address and the website that the
trackers were included on. This enables the trackers to infer
which websites the users are visiting, even though the users
may believe they are protected by Hotspot Shield.
Better tools to improve inference literacy could help stu-
dents make more informed decisions about when and how
they use VPNs, as well as which VPNs to use. Such a tool
might show students (1) what data VPNs may collect about
them; (2) what data leaks outside of the VPN (e.g., to ISPs,
content providers), ultimately improving their ability to select
a VPN provider. In the case of Hotspot Shield, this tool could
be a browser extension that logs which websites the aforemen-
tioned trackers are included on, and thus communicated with
outside of the VPN. Designing such a tool entails addressing
several challenges and design decisions:
What information should be included? Researchers need
to take into an account what information should be shown, as
sole information about instances of data leakages may not be
informative for students. In fact, they could only deepen the
feeling of powerlessness, since many students did not fully
understand how VPNs work anyway. We believe that VPN
users not only need information about data leakages but also
what they mean, how valuable data is, what they can do to
protect themselves, and provide positive reinforcement along
the way. Not enough explanation could result in no change in
students’ behaviors or attitudes toward VPNs’ practices.
When information should be shown, and when? We be-
lieve that tools that display information about data leakages
and provide opportunities to act upon them could empower
users. This could in turn mitigate the learned helplessness that
users feel about data collection. A browser extension could
present this information to users in real-time, which would
signal an opportunity for users to stop using the VPN provider
or to switch providers. Users could also benefit from learning
about the data collection practices of VPN providers before or
at the time of selecting a VPN provider. The same information
that is measured in real-time by a browser extension could be
aggregated and presented to users as they are selecting VPNs,
empowering users to choose a provider that meets their needs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored how university students choose
VPNs, how they use them, and their general attitudes about
data collection by commercial VPN providers. Through inter-
views and a large scale survey, we discovered that (1) many
students chose VPNs primarily to circumvent network con-
trols or to access blocked content; (2) concerns about privacy
were important but secondary to accessing content; (3) stu-
dents generally understand what VPNs enable them to do but
not much about how they work; and (4) students generally
expected their VPN provider to be collecting data about them.
It became clear through our study that although students
valued privacy in the abstract, the choice of VPN software
and provider was ultimately a pragmatic question of content
access, performance, and cost. Given the existing practices
of VPN providers, from data collection about users to well-
documented and studied data leakages from VPNs, students
(and users in general) could benefit from better tools and
interventions that explain the risks that they assume when
choosing and using a VPN—and that many of them, in spite
of their name, may not provide much in the way of privacy.
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